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I. Introduction
The evolution of the Bulgarian economy between the fall of the communist wall and 1996 may be characterized by high instability. With only 20% of assets being privatized before 1997 and political pressure on banks to subsidy loss-generating state-owned companies, the financial system became increasingly fragile and accumulated massive amounts of "bad" credits. This "bad" dynamic in the transition process was accompanied by deterioration in monetary conditions. To overcome the reduction of foreign currency reserves to some 500 million USD, the monetary authorities proceeded to subsequent exchange rate devaluations in 1994-1995. These devaluations had only some temporary effect and reserves dropped again to some critical threshold in mid-1996, leading to the start of the crisis. During 1997, after several devaluations superior to 50%, the exchange rate of the Bulgarian Lev (BGL) with respect to the US Dollar (USD) suffered an impressive devaluation of 230%, reserves felt to a historical minimum of 300 million USD, monthly inflation and the base interest rate rose up to 250%, real activity shrank by 7% and unemployment climbed to 14%
(for more details see Berlemann and Nenovsky, 2004) .
Following this severe twin (currency and banking) crisis, there was need for a new monetary system. This new system should answer to two requirements: stop the crisis and provide long-term stability. Since an inflation-targeting system is based on reputation and thus powerless in the short-run, Bulgaria adopted on February the 17 th 1997 the decision to introduce a Currency Board (CB) monetary system (the CB became effective after the April elections, namely starting July the 1 st 1997). Thus, Bulgaria joined Estonia and Lithuania who introduced CBs in 1992 and 1994 respectively.
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The goal of the present paper is to explore the influence of the adoption of the CB monetary system in terms of the integration of Bulgaria into the European Monetary Union (EMU). Indeed, embracing a CB is a rather strong and radical decision, since monetary authorities lose the autonomy of the monetary policy, as "market forces alone determine the quantity of notes and coins in circulation" (Schuler, 1992, p.2) . Thus, it would be interesting to examine if the cost of accepting the loss of monetary policy autonomy was backed up by better performances, particularly with respect to other Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) that conserved monetary autonomy, in terms of EMU integration.
To this end, we move away from the existing literature by exploring the consequences of the presence of a CB in two directions. First, we aim at identifying an appropriate exogenous monetary shock, as domestic monetary variables, and in particular the Bulgarian interest rate, which are often used as a source of monetary disturbances (see, for example, Elbourne and de Haan, 2006) are endogenous in a CB monetary system. 2 After considering several potential candidates, we select the ECB interest rate and the FED interest rate as the main sources of monetary shocks affecting the Bulgarian economy. 3 Second, as recently stressed out by Egert and MacDonald (2009) , the largest majority of papers studying monetary policy transmission build on (recursive) Structural VARs (SVARs). However, while more is known about monetary policy transmission in countries with autonomous monetary policy, the evidence about the order in which shocks propagate under a CB is still very crude.
To avoid this kind of misspecifications, we use a different approach, based on Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) , which, contrary to (recursive) SVARs, present the property of being insensitive to the ordering of variables. 4 We find first that the responses of Bulgarian variables to ECB shocks are short-lived The effect of changes in the FED interest rate transits through the trade activity with the United States, but also (particularly) with countries that are/were linked to the USD in recent times, namely Turkey, Russia, etc. 7 A certain strand of the literature focuses on the distinction between "first generation" (orthodox) and "second generation" (quasi-CB) Currency Boards (see Hanke, 2007) . Since the Bulgarian CB is of second-generation, the BNB may, contrary to orthodox CBs, run some restricted form of active monetary policy, mainly through three instruments: the minimum required ratio (see Nenovsky et al, 2001) , the BNB account with the Government (see Nenovsky and Hristov, 2002) , and the Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR) function (see Berlemann and Nenovsky, 2004) . However, as pointed out by these authors, changes in these instruments are extremely rare and their
Data and methodological considerations
To investigate the effects of monetary policy disturbances on the Bulgarian economy, we consider a multivariate representation. We first describe the data and examine the time series properties of variables, before discussing the modelling strategy. (a) We apply the KPSS test using the procedure of Sul et al. (2005) to estimate the long-run variance.
(b) We used the AIC criterion to select the order of the autoregressive correction with pmax
We report the finite sample critical values drawn from the response surfaces in Sephton (1995) . The null hypothesis of the KPSS test is "stationarity around a constant or around a (linear) time trend".
Methodological Considerations
Since all series taken in level are integrated of order zero, it is possible to investigate the dynamic relationships among our set of variables in a VAR model using innovation accounting methods such as impulse response functions. For the reasons described in the introduction we implement the recently developed "generalized" impulse response functions 10 In contrast to unit root tests, stationarity tests specify the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of non-stationarity, so they can be seen as the reversal complement of the unit root tests. 11 Besides, on the one hand, further unit root tests (for example Elliott-Rothemberg-Stock ERS, 1996, results are available upon request) reject the presence of a unit root in all considered series. On the other hand, since in all considered VARs in levels IRFs rapidly come to zero after a shock on a variable supports that series are ( )
(GIRFs) suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1998) , which are insensitive to the ordering of the variables in the VAR (see Appendix A).
12 Besides, the ability of the GIRFs to capture immediate responses of endogenous variables to shocks is clearly useful when information is quickly assimilated, as it may be the case in a CB.
III. VAR investigation and examination of dynamic responses
In the first subsection we study the response of variables following an impulse on the ECB interest rate. These results are completed in the second subsection by evidence following a change in the FED monetary policy.
The effect of a change in the ECB interest rate on the Bulgarian economy
We first illustrate results for the basic VAR, before exploring the robustness of our findings.
The basic model
Since our results are based on GIRFs, the order of variables in the VAR is unimportant. Let us suppose, without generality loss, the following transmission scheme:
shock is considered to impact first the Bulgarian interest rate ( ) BG i . Changes in interest rate BG i are supposed to affect the growth rate of real activity (output), followed by changes in consumer prices IPC and in domestic nominal money growth M .
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Before implementing a generalized impulse response analysis, we must choose the optimal lag length in the benchmark VAR. Using the LR test and four information criteria (see Appendix 1), we choose the lag 1. Appendix 2 reports the inverse roots of the AR characteristic polynomial of the estimated VAR and clearly confirms its stationarity, since all roots lie inside the unit circle (see Lütkepohl, 1991) . Consequently, the estimated VAR may be used for a generalized impulse response analysis. 14 To check the quality of the multivariate estimation, we performed several test concerning the serial correlation (LM tests), as well as ARCH tests and the Jarque-Bera normality test. Results in Appendix 1 confirm that the VAR model is well behaved and not subject to misspecification, since all usual hypotheses 12 For robustness issues, we compare GIRFs with IRFs from a SVAR (see section 3.1.2 below). 13 According to KPSS stationarity tests in Table 1 , all series are considered in level and we include a constant. 14 Since (i) all series of our database are integrated of order zero and (ii) the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial of the estimated VAR all lie inside the unit circle, the question of cointegration testing between these series is of course not relevant. 
Note for all VARs:
The fact that GIRFs to shocks stabilize and come back towards zero indicates on the one hand, that the VAR model is correctly specified and, on the other, that all macroeconomic series are integrated of order zero.
Figure 1 provides interesting evidence about the reaction of domestic variables in a CB monetary system, following exogenous external shocks. First, we observe that an increase in the ECB interest rate leads to a non significant increase in the Bulgarian interest rate on the impact; afterwards, the Bulgarian interest rate follows the ECB rate with a small lag (about 1-2 quarters). However, the response of the Bulgarian interest rate is both short-lasted, since statistically significant at the 5% lever for only 4 quarters, and with a low magnitude of 0.4% arising after 4-5 quarters. With respect to the existent literature, two points worth be noticing.
First, our result is contrary to previous studies outlining large and persistent effects in CEEC with monetary autonomy. For example, a recent contribution from Gavin and Kemme (2009) finds that the interest rate presents a significant reaction for 12 quarters for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Second, our finding are in line with previous evidence on the existence of small and non-significant responses of the domestic interest rate in countries with monetary systems close to Bulgaria, see EFN (2004) for the CBs in Estonia and Lithuania. Thus, the endogenous Bulgarian interest rate is, compared to other countries, intimately linked to the ECB rate, in terms of magnitude, significance and dynamics (lag); this rapid transmission of shocks may suggest that Bulgaria is better integrated with the EMU with respect to other CEEC (as it also seems to be the case for other countries with a CB monetary system).
What is however striking is that output first increases, before exhibiting the traditional hump-shaped, as a response to a higher interest rate. As for the adjustment of the Bulgarian interest rate, this may be seen as a sign for good monetary integration. Indeed, agents anticipate that, given the strict monetary linkage of Bulgaria with the EMU through the CB, the divergences between the Bulgarian interest rate and the ECB rate cannot be long-lasting; or, to put it differently, the Bulgarian interest rate is expected to closely follow the path of the ECB rate. However, for a short period of time the domestic interest rate is lower with respect to the ECB rate, which may enhance investment and consumption, provided that the financial market is sufficiently integrated to the Euro Area markets in order to supply the necessary amount of liquidity; 15 in this case, output increases. Nevertheless, as explained above, the interest rate differential is short-lived: as soon as the two rates are converging, the Bulgarian output exhibits the traditional hump-shaped response according to the related literature; yet again, this response is statistically non-significant.
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Consequently, the behaviour of the Bulgarian output presents two different outcomes with respect to other CEEC: on the one hand, there is no evidence of such a positive reaction of output in the short-run (see Table 5 Concerning the remaining variables, money positively responds in the short-run, which may be in accordance with the CB functioning: since the money stock in Bulgaria is money-demand determined, the raise in nominal 3 M naturally follows the short-run increase in output (a transaction motive). As for prices, in a country with complete autonomy of 15 We elaborate on the Bulgarian financial sector in the next section (see the robustness tests (b)). 16 There exists an alternative explanation for the positive reaction of output following a monetary contraction, equally based on the crucial role of expectations. Using monthly data, Elbourne and de Haan (2006) report such an effect for Romania, which in their view may arise if the increase in the interest rate is seen as a change in the monetary strategy for fighting inflation, in high inflation countries. This explanation may also apply to Bulgaria, where the fixed exchange rate strictly constraints the Bulgarian inflation to follow the Euro Area inflation, all the more that in Bulgaria devaluations are forbidden by the law.
monetary policy one would expect an increase in the interest rate to reduce inflation. The counter-intuitive increase in inflation is not new (the so-called "price puzzle", see Sims, 1992) , but in our analysis this increase may also reproduce the pressure on prices coming from the increase in output. Finally, notice that the statistical significance of the responses of both prices and money is modest, as it was previously pointed out for other European countries with a CB (see EFN, 2004) .
Our interpretation of these results builds on the idea that both Bulgarian interest rate and money are endogenous with respect to external monetary shocks. Since the Bulgarian economy is closely linked to the EMU, both in terms of financial markets and the exchange rate, agents expect the Bulgarian interest rate to rapidly follow the ECB rate dynamics. In our case, agents anticipate a future increase in the domestic interest rate, and, to take benefit of a current interest rate lower than in the future, they increase domestic consumption and investment, which leads to a higher output in the short-run, and moreover higher prices and money. However, as previously acknowledged, these effects are, contrary to evidence for the CEEC with monetary autonomy, short-lived and little significant, suggesting that the Bulgarian economy may be better integrated into the EMU with respect to these countries.
Robustness Tests
Before presenting robustness tests, we would like to readdress the issue of comparing GIRFs and SVARs. As already emphasized, the advantage of GIRFs is that responses are immune to the ordering of the variables, which may be important when there is little knowledge about this order (as it may be the case in a CB). However, this also implies giving up the advantages of SVARs, namely the use of economic-derived constraints to achieve SVAR identification. Suppose the transmission mechanisms used above, namely
, which now reflects our economic intuition. To capture this transmission, we may use a recursive SVAR, with variables specified in this same order. IRFs depicted in Appendix B show that the response of Bulgarian variables is still short-lived and of low magnitude, in line with previous evidence.
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With respect to the basic VAR we now consider several experiments to check its robustness, by estimating different alternative VAR models. Elbourne and de Hann (2004) identified three main sources of cross-country heterogeneity, namely i) different identification 17 Finally, one may contest the transmission mechanism described above, in particular after the Bulgarian output. Consequently, we have estimated a SVAR model in which IPC and M change order ( M is placed fourth and IPC fifth). We report that results for this SVAR are qualitatively unchanged (results are available upon request).
schemes, ii) different variables, and iii) different time periods. One could agree that the use of GIRFs protects our results from the first problem. Moreover, if introducing other variables has little impact on our results, 18 one may criticise our findings with respect to the choice of the time period and the length of the sample (the third problem). To tackle this issue, we discuss three developments of the benchmark VAR: (a) we reduce the number of variables, (b) we consider the option of a structural break with respect to the reforms of the Bulgarian financial system, and (c) we increase the number of observations by using monthly data. According to Figure 2 , following a positive shock on the ECB interest rate, the Bulgarian interest rate path is close to its path in the basic VAR, while output is still significantly raising in the short-run. Real money increases in the short-run, but, contrary to nominal money, its response is not statistically significant, showing once again that in a CB real effects are narrow. In a previous version of the paper we show that our main results are unaffected when controlling for different variables outside the VAR structure, namely the public deficit (or debt) to GDP ratio, or external prices (or the world commodity prices) to check for the robustness of the initial raise in prices (the usual "price puzzle", although in our setup the rise in prices may be explained by the initial increase in output 6,00% Q3 1999 Q3 2000 Q3 2001 Q3 2002 Q3 2003 Q3 2004 Q3 2005 Q3 2006 Q3 2007 Q3 2008 Q3 2009 Q3 2010 iEURO iBG
One can easily observe that the LIBOR and the Bulgarian interest rates seem to follow rather different dynamics up until the middle of 2003. Indeed, at that period, the Bulgarian banking system experienced several reforms. These reforms concern the presence of high (above requested) liquidity ratios, the progressive reduction of high risks exposures and of the share of credits to the public sector, and the appearance of a Banking Department within the BNB, which deals exclusively with bank supervision and regulation.
Moreover, the process of bank privatization in Bulgaria was achieved in that period,
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and on June the 2 nd 2003 the BNB adopted the RINGS (Real-time INterbank Gross Settlement) system which allowed for real-time settlement between banks (previously, settlements were allowed at fixed hours, several times a day). Finally, this decision went 19 The number of foreign commercial banks increased from 14 (1997) to 35 (2003) , and their share in total banking assets from 32. 7% (1996) to 72.8% (2005) , the largest majority of foreign banks being EMU-based.
along with the suppression of the 0.5% fee on exchange operations and with the allowance to exchange BGL against EURO brought from abroad (and the other way around).
To account for these changes, we present in Figure 4 Response output, which we replace by the industrial production. Figure 5 below depicts response functions following a shock on the ECB interest rate. Results on monthly data expand and confirm the findings on quarterly data for the same period (see Figure 4 above). The domestic interest rate follows the ECB rate with a lag in the short-term, and then the two paths exhibit similar dynamics. Output increases in the short run and then becomes rapidly statistically insignificant, as it is the case for prices and money, confirming that in a CB monetary system shocks on the ECB rate are short lasted and of low magnitude. Our results are all the more robust, as some authors have pointed out noticeable changes in the response functions when one changes the frequency of the data (see for example, Egert and MacDonald, 2009).
The impact of a change in the FED policy on the Bulgarian economy
While the analysis up to this point is dedicated to the interest rate channel, we focus in this subsection on the exchange rate channel. Of course, the CB in Bulgaria implies that the exchange rate with the anchor (the EURO) is constant, which is why this analysis is unfeasible. However, Bulgaria still has important trade relations with countries like Turkey, Russia etc., and these countries are/were heavily linked to the USD. Therefore, we estimate that changes in the FED policy, as well as in the BGL/USD exchange rate, may have some influence on the Bulgarian economy.
We study the reaction of the Bulgarian economy following a change in the FED interest rate, and we assume a transmission mechanism identical to the one in the benchmark model, with two exceptions: we replace the ECB rate with the FED rate, which is now the source of exogenous shocks, and we introduce the Bulgarian Lev to USD exchange rate just after the FED rate. In this way, results are comparable to our previous findings regarding changes in EU i .
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Figure 5 -Effects of a change in the FED interest rate Response of M to IUS Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
The effects of the FED interest rate on the Bulgarian economy are quite different when compared to the impact of the ECB rate. The Bulgarian interest rate presents no significant reaction in the first quarters, suggesting that shocks on FED take more time to be absorbed. This is also true for prices and money, which exhibit some significance after several quarters.
In particular we find again the positive correlation between domestic interest rate, prices and money, as money is basically demand-driven in the CB. Output is statistically significant increasing in the short-run, which may be explained by (i) the initial contraction of BG i which may favour domestic investment, and (ii) by a competitiveness effect that transits through the exchange rate channel. Indeed, observe that an increase in US i leads to a statistically significant increase in the BGL/USD exchange rate, namely a "standard" depreciation of the LEV with respect to the USD (a higher US i increases US asset demand relatively to the demand in the rest-of-the-world assets). However, in the medium-run, the Bulgarian interest 21 The FED interest rate is also stationary (see Table 1 ), while Appendix 4 suggests the adoption of the lag 1.
rate significantly increases and follows the raise in the FED rate, which offsets output.
Finally, notice that results are qualitatively unchanged when considering that shocks in the FED transit first through the ECB rate, before affecting Bulgarian variables (see Appendix C).
Consequently, on the one hand, compared to their response to ECB rate shocks, Bulgarian variables respond less in the short-run; the responses become significant latter in time; and they display more persistent reactions to shocks (4 to 5 quarters more for prices and money, for instance). These results may suggest that Bulgaria is more integrated with the EMU, compared to other regions (in our case, the USD area). On the other hand, the exchange rate has relatively little impact (in terms of size, persistence and significance) on the Bulgarian economy, with respect to its impact in countries with autonomous monetary policy, as it is the case for Hungary and Poland where Touré, Trabelsi and Dufourt (2009) conclude to an important role for the exchange rate.
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IV. Conclusion
The goal of the present paper is to present evidence regarding the integration of We find that the Bulgarian interest rate follows, with a small lag, the ECB interest rate dynamics in the short-run, while it follows the FED interest rate dynamics with a certain delay. Regarding other monetary and real variables (output, money or prices), they exhibit smaller persistence and become non-significant earlier in time following an ECB interest rate (2) denotes Jarque-Bera (with two degrees of freedom) normality test. b -the number in brackets indicates the marginal asymptotic level, namely the probability to exceed the value of the computed statistic. Hence, for instance, a marginal asymptotic level of 23.79% (0.2379) means that for a significance level smaller than 23.79%, the null hypothesis of absence of residual serial correlation of order 4 cannot be rejected by data. Response of M to IEU Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Note:
The fact that IRFs to shocks stabilize and come back towards zero indicates, on the one hand, that the SVAR model is correctly specified and, on the other, that all macroeconomic series are integrated of order zero. Response of M to IUS
Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
